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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD-EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF
LABOR DISPUTE
Stryjewski v. Brewery Drivers Local 830, 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d
264 (1967).
On January 10, 1967, a Teamsters union affiliate1 began peace-
ful picketing of the Stryjewskis' retail beer distributing company.2
The union's alleged purposes were to publicize that the com-
pany was non-union and to organize the employees.' The Stryjew-
skis' instituted an action in equity in the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas seeking both monetary damages and an injunction
to terminate the picketing. After a hearing the court refused to
issue a preliminary injunction on the grounds that under the
pertinent provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 4 the mat-
ter was arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board.5 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Stryjewski v. Brewery Drivers Local 8306 affirmed.7  The court
held that until the United States Supreme Court has spoken di-
rectly on the subject or pending an actual declination to act by the
NLRB, a state court should not assume jurisdiction.
The court's reluctance to take jurisdiction was the result of
NLRB policy8 and the landmark Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
1. Local Union 830, Brewery & Beer Distributor Drivers, Helpers &
Platform Men.
2. The Stryjewski company, Tacony Beer Distributing Company, is a
"D Distributor." The Union has a collective bargaining agreement with
other distributors who import the beer from outside the state and sell to
so-called "D Distributors" like the Stryjewskis. These D Distributors then
resell at either retail or wholesale, but not to other distributors. The im-
porting distributors collective bargaining agreement requires that the D
Distributors may not pick up beer but that all beer supplied to them
must be delivered. Thus, picketing of the D Distributors effectively cuts
off their beer supplies since the importer's union employees will not cross
the picket line to make deliveries. Stryjewski v. Brewery Drivers Local
830, 426 Pa. 512, 519, 233 A.2d 264, 265 (1967).
3. 426 Pa. at 514, 233 A.2d at 265 (testimony of the president and
business agent of the union).
4. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1965).
5. Hereinafter called NLRB or Board.
6. 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967).
7. Id. at 519, 233 A.2d at 268. This was a 4-2 decision.
8. For the first 15 years of its existence, the Board determined when
not to exercise jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. In 1950, the Board
began to utilize varying sets of jurisdictional standards to aid it in making
such determinations. See Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 82 (1958)
(non-retail business); Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 NLRB 88
(1958) (retail business); HPO Service, Inc., 122 NLRB 394 (1958) (trans-
porting in interstate commerce).
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Board9 decision which has produced a state-federal "no-man's-
land" in labor relations proceedings. 10 To cure this vacuum, the
Guss court felt legislative, not judicial, action was required. Con-
gress, in what proved to be an ineffective attempt to eradicate this
jurisdictional void added section 164(c) to the NLRA by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.11 This section
provides in part:
(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may by rule or de-
cision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of
such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Pro-
vided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdic-
tion over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August
1,1959.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to
prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State ...
from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor dis-
putes over which the Board declines, pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
2
Thus, the statutorily imposed rule is that in labor disputes 13 in
which the Board declines to act, the states are free to assert juris-
diction.
The Supreme Court has yet to render an opinion in which it
has interpreted the word "decline." Certain guidelines, however,
are available to the states for determining when they may act.
Before Congress enacted section 164(c), San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon14 established the rule that for those cases argu-
ably subject to section 7 and section 8 of the NLRA, the Board has
exclusive jurisdiction.15 The Garmon exclusive jurisdiction rule,
9. 357 U.S. 1, (1957). See also, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fair-
lawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
10. The phrase appeared first in Senate Report No. 187, April 14, 1959,
as reported in 1959-2, U.S. CoDn CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2318, 2341. For a
fuller discussion of this problem see Aaron, The Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1086 (1960); Goldberg
and Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments with Emphasis on
the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 747 (1960); Hanley, Federal-State
Jurisdiction in Labor's No Man's Land: 1960, 48 GEO. L.J. 709 (1960).
11. This legislation is also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29
U.S.C. § 164 (1964).
12. Id. § 164(c).
13. This term has been held to include the demands of a union to
unionize a plant in which it has no members. E.g., Lauf v. Shinner & Co.,
Inc., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); NLRB v. Mackey Radio & Telegraph Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938).
14. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
15. When an activity is arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the Act,
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although of questionable value in this argumentative age, is used
by some courts as a basis for refusing to assert jurisdiction in
picketing-for-recognition disputes.16
Section 164(c) allows the Board "by rule of decision or by
published rules" to decline to act in labor disputes involving classes
or categories of employers. The "published rules" language has
been interpreted by the NLRB to refer to its previously enunci-
ated jurisdictional yardsticks.17 In Carolina Supplies and Cement
Co.' 8 the Board set forth its yardstick in labor disputes involving
retail businesses. It held that it would assert jurisdiction only over
labor disputes involving retail businesses which fall within its
statutory jurisdiction and which have a gross volume of business of
at least $500,000 annually. 19 Assuming that the activity is not ar-
guably subject to its statutory provisions and that in a retail con-
cern the gross volume of business falls below the $500,000 minimum
gross volume, must the NLRB actually decline jurisdiction in each
case, or may it prospectively decline over an entire class of labor
disputes? In construing the language of Section 164(c) state courts
have reached two conflicting conclusions. 20
the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive compe-
tency of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 245 (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Sax Enterprises, 358 U.S.
270 (1959); Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Brewery Drivers Local 830, 408 Pa. 380,
184 A.2d 243 (1963); Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 402 Pa. 325,
166 A2d 625 (1960); Wax v. Int'l Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603
(1960). See generally, 69 DICK. L. REv. 319 (1965).
16. Marine Engineers Bene. Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370
U.S. 173 (1962); Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Brewery Drivers Local 830, 408
Pa. 380, 184 A.2d 243 (1962); Stoddard-Wendle Motor Co. v. Automotive
Machinists Lodge 942, 48 Wash. 2d 519, 295 P.2d 305 (1956); see generally,
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 530 (1948).
17. NLRB Press Release No. R-576, issued October 2, 1958.
18. 122 NLRB 88 (1958). The NLRB prefers fixed standards rather
than an ad hoc policy for determining its exercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 83 (1958).
19. Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 NLRB 88 (1958). Al-
though in Stryjewski the gross annual sales were $230,000, the state
court used the addition process consistent with board policy. Thus, for
jurisdictional purposes the lower court added the Stryjewskis' gross re-
ceipts to those of the importing distributors. 426 Pa. at 518, 233 A.2d at
272 (dissenting opinion).
20. Courts which hold there must be an actual declination in each
case: Colorado State Council of Carpenters v. District Court, 155 Colo. 54,
392 P.2d 601 (1964); Barksdale & LeBlanc v. Electrical Workers Local 130,
143 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1962); cf. Hirsh v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Bowlavar, Inc. v. Truck Drivers Local 90, 252 Iowa 851, 109
N.W.2d 22 (1961). Courts which hold that they may apply the standards
themselves: Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409
P.2d 926, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966); Continental Slip Form Builders v. Con-
struction Laborers Local 1290, 193 Kan. 459, 393 P.2d 1004 (1964); Meat
Cutters Local 227 v. Fleischaker Co., 284 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. App. 1964); Smith
v. Hoel, 188 N.E.2d 195 (C.P. Ohio 1963). Prior to Stryjewski, a Pennsyl-
vania lower court leaned toward the prospective decline approach: Reilly's
Beer Distributors v. Teamsters Local 830, 52 Del. 138 (C.P. Pa. 1964).
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The California case of Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 56921
represents the "prospective decline" approach which permits the
state courts to anticipate the Board's decision over a class of cases
using the published yardsticks. In Russell, the plaintiff, an elec-
trical contractor, began work with a three-man non-union crew on
an apartment building then under construction. Defendant union
began picketing. Some of the contractor's supplies moved in inter-
state commerce, and the parties agreed that the labor dispute
came within the NLRB's statutory jurisdiction. The contractor's
gross annual revenue, however, was only $19,000. The contractor
applied to the Superior Court, which granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, pending trial, against further picketing and against work stop-
pages.2 2 The California Supreme Court affirmed this decision. In
a unanimous decision, the court said:
We hold that the jurisdiction exercised by the state courts
pursuant to section 164 (c) does not depend upon a showing
that the board has, in fact, declined to act. Rather, we
believe that the party seeking relief need only demon-
strate, on the basis of published regulations and decisions
of the board, that the case is one which the board would
decline to hear.
23
Opposed to this view is the "wait and see" approach exempli-
fied by Colorado State Council of Carpenters v. District Court.
24
There, a construction contractor was to build a water reservoir at
a cost of approximately $460,000. The Colorado court, without
giving supporting reasons, took the position that state courts have
no jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing in the absence of a
showing that the NLRB has specifically declined to accept jurisdic-
tion over the controversy.
25
Prior to Stryjewski, Pennsylvania's position was unclear. In a
1963 case in which the gross annual dollar volume of the retail
business involved exceeded the minimum stated by the NLRB in its
published jurisdictional yardsticks, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held an actual decline was necessary.26 One year later, how-
Compare Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Brewery Drivers Local 830, 408 Pa. 380,
184 A.2d 243 (1963) (actual decline necessary where interstate shipments ex-
ceed $500,000 annually and thus come within published jurisdictional guide-
lines).
21. 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409 P.2d 926, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966).
22. Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 43 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Cal.
App. 1965).
23. 64 Cal. 2d at 23, 409 P.2d at 926, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (emphasis
added). See note 20 supra.
24. 155 Colo. 54, 392 P.2d 601 (1964).
25. Id. at 57, 392 P.2d at 602.
26. Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Brewery Drivers Local 830, 408 Pa. 380,
194 A.2d 243 (1963). The brewery's shipments were interstate and were
in excess of the $50,000 minimum. The NLRB has indicated jurisdiction
would be asserted over all enterprises transporting commodities in inter-
state commerce provided they derive at least $50,000 in gross annual rev-
enue from such operations. See HPO Service, Inc., 122 NLRB 394 (1958).
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ever, in Reilly's Beer Distributors v. Teamsters Local 830,27 de-
fendant union attempted through peaceful picketing to gain rep-
resentation of the plaintiff's non-union employees. Plaintiff Reilly's
gross annual business was shown to be less than half the published
minimum for retail businesses not engaged in transporting com-
modities in interstate commerce. The common pleas court said an
actual decline was unnecessary. It felt that by previously published
NLRB jurisdictional yardsticks, the Board had already declined
this case. Therefore, it granted a preliminary injunction against
the picketing.
28
Notwithstanding Reilly's Beer Distributors and the position
taken by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 29 Stryjewski
adopted the view that section 164 (c) does not allow a state
court using NLRB yardsticks to anticipate NLRB reaction in
a particular case. Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff had
proved that, in all probability, the Board would refuse to act,30 the
court nevertheless chose not to anticipate the Board's actual deci-
sion. Observing that although the Board through its rules has
established certain jurisdictional standards, the cases necessarily
will present many variables. Until there has been an actual decli-
nation to act by the NLRB in a particular case, said the court,
individual state court resolutions without direction would result in
a chaotic situation harmful to a national labor policy.8 ' There-
fore, it concluded, in the absence of a United States Supreme Court
construction of section 164(c) and in the absence of an actual decline
to act by the Board, a state court should not act.
3 2
Stryjewski is difficult to reconcile with the principle justify-
ing a petition for preliminary injunctive relief: the need for swift
action. To require that the NLRB must in each case actually de-
cline jurisdiction before the state judicial forum becomes available
27. 52 Del. 138 (C.P. Pa. 1964).
28. Id. at 143.
29. The procedure followed by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board is to hear evidence as to the size of the employer's business and
compare this with the NLRB's published standards to determine jurisdic-
tion. TwENTY-TI De ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD at 1 (1959).
30. The court found, contrary to the lower court, the only Stryjewski
"employee" was their son. 426 Pa. at 517, 233 A.2d at 267. By the provi-
sions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, such a person
would not be included in the term employee. Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964); Citrus Ass'n v. NLRB,
109 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 632, reh. denied, 311 U.S.
724 (1940). The NLRB actually declined to take jurisdiction on the day of
the oral argument before the court. 426 Pa. at 525, 233 A.2d at 271.
31. Chief Justice Bell, dissenting, strongly challenged whether such
cases would interfere with national policy: "Imagine a business composed
of husband and wife and son endangering the national policy." 426 Pa. at
520-21, 233 A.2d at 269 (dissenting opinion).
32. 426 Pa. at 518-19, 233 A.2d at 268.
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strips the preliminary injunction of its effectiveness.33 As the
California court noted in Russell:
To require the parties to submit every case to the board
for determination of the jurisdictional question would
frustrate the clearly manifested intent of Congress that the
board be empowered to delimit the boundaries of its juris-
diction by "rule of decision or by published rules." We
would strip these rules of their legal significance were we
to require reference of every case to the board.
3 4
Moreover, a great majority of Pennsylvania employers fall below
the minimum standards set by the Board for its exercise of juris-
diction.3 5  The Stryjewski rule would seem to deny many of the
state's citizens relief in labor disputes neither protected nor pre-
empted by the NLRB.3 6 In his dissent in Stryjewski, Chief Jus-
tice Bell found that: "By the time the NLRB specifically decides
that it will not take jurisdiction of this case . . . the poor little
Stryjewski family will be broke, or out of business.
' '37
Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies this area, the
"prospective decline" approach of the California court seems the
better course to follow. By examining Board decisions, courts can
determine specific classes of cases over which the NLRB will refuse
33. See the dissenting opinion by Roberts, J., 426 Pa. at 525, 233 A.2d
at 271.
34. 64 Cal. 2d at 25, 409 P.2d at 928, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
35. The size of the no-man's-land has been estimated by the Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Board. By their figures 90% of Pennsylvania
employers employ 24 or less employees, and most if not all of these em-
ployers have a volume of business falling below the standards set by the
NLRB. These businesses employ about 20% of the employees of the state.
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, at 2 (1955). See also, Stephens, The No Man's Land Of Labor Rela-
tions Remains Unoccupied, 14 LAB. L.J. 192, 193 (1963).
36. Compare the position of the Idaho Supreme Court in Lockridge v.
Motor Coach Employees, 93 Idaho 201, 369 P.2d 1006 (1962):
In view of the unsettled state of the federal law, our course
is clear. We must assert jurisdiction in every doubtful case, to the
end that our citizens be not denied relief for wrongs "neither pro-
tected nor prohibited" nor "preempted" by federal law, or more
appropriately, by the National Labor Relations Board.
Id. at 208, 369 P.2d at 1010.
37. 426 Pa. at 520-21, 233 A.2d at 269 (dissenting opinion). As one
writer has prophetically put it:
[N]either the small employer nor his employees are given the pro-
tection of the laws which Congress passed to promote collective
bargaining. This is a paradox, since it is in the smaller shops and
firms that most of the unorganized workers are located, and it is
in this area where collective bargaining is the weakest. Perhaps
some people think that this situation is beneficial to the smaller
employer. One would only have to ask them what they would do
if they managed a small business and a representative of a large
union, for example, the Teamsters, appeared and demanded that
they sign a collective bargaining agreement with the union.
Stephens, The No Man's Land Of Labor Relations Remains Unoccupied, 14
LAB. L. J. 192, 200 (1963).
[Vol. 72
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jurisdiction. 3 The Board itself has not said whether it wishes the
opportunity to decline jurisdiction in each case prior to state ac-
tion. A construction of section 164(c) by the courts to exclude
those labor disputes where business volume falls below published
NLRB yardsticks would enable courts to anticipate Board action,
issue necessary injunctive relief, and fill the vacuum that now
exists. The contrary "wait and see" approach, espoused by the
Stryjewski court in an effort to further an ill-defined national labor
policy, may mean financial ruin for many smaller retail busi-
nesses through loss of business caused by possibly illegal picketing.
At the very least, these businesses would operate in Pennsylvania
under the distinct disadvantage of having a statutory right with-
out an effective legal remedy.
PETER F. STUART
38. Radio and Telephone Broadcast Technicians v. Broadcast Service,
Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965). Cf. Building & Trades Council v. Broome, 377
U.S. 126 (1964).
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VIOLATIONS CAN BE HARMLESS ERROR
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1967)
Following his conviction for second degree murder, Leroy
Padgett filed a motion under the Post Conviction Hearing Act'
alleging that the trial court committed error in allowing a statement
to be introduced into evidence which was obtained in the absence
of counsel when assistance of counsel was required by Escobedo
v. Illinois.2 Padgett's statement was used at trial for impeachment
purposes only. The Commonwealth conceded that the statement in
question was obtained from Padgett under circumstances that vio-
lated the constitutional requirements of Escobedo but contended
that the statement was admissible for the purpose of impeaching
credibility. The court rejected this contention since "a careful
reading of Escobedo in light of the gloss placed upon that deci-
sion by Miranda v. Arizona"' makes the conclusion inescapable that
a statement obtained in violation of Escobedo may not be used by
the prosecution, even for impeachment purposes.4 The Common-
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180 (Supp. 1966).
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In this case the Supreme Court set up the
following constitutional safeguards:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has re-
quested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
"the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution . . .and that no statement elicited by the police
during the interrogation may be used against him at criminal trial.
Id. at 490, 491.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Here the Supreme Court refined the above
constitutional safeguards as follows:
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities
in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards
must be employed to protect the privilege . . .and to assure that
the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following
measures are required. He must be warned prior to any ques-
tioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attor-
ney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires .... But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Id. at 478, 479.
4. 428 Pa. at 231, 232, 237 A.2d at 210.
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wealth, however, asserted that even if the use of the statement was
error, it was harmless error. The court agreed, holding that
Escobedo and Miranda violations can be harmless error and
found the error in Padgett to be such a case.5
In holding that Escobedo and Miranda violations can be harm-
less error, the court in Padgett had to resolve a conflict between
two doctrines. The first is the harmless error standard of Chap-
man v. California6 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held:
there may be some constitutional errors which in the set-
ting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignifi-
cant that they may ... be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction.
7
However, before a constitutional error can be deemed harmless,
under the Chapman rule, the court must believe that it was "harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt" and the burden of so proving is
on the prosecution. Running counter to the harmless error rule is
the doctrine of automatic reversal by which there are "some con-
stitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error ....
Since Chapman there have been a number of instances where
the harmless error standard has been applied to constitutional
error other than an Escobedo or Miranda violation,10 yet in only
two of these cases was the error explicitly held to be "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.""' The United States Supreme Court
5. Id. at 236, 237 A.2d at 212.
6. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
7. Id. at 22. In Chapman the question was whether numerous un-
favorable references by the prosectution and the trial judge to defendant's
refusal to testify under the Fifth Amendment necessitated automatic re-
versal. The Court concluded that this was constitutional error but de-
clined to reverse unless the error was harmful. The error was found to be
harmful and the conviction was reversed.
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id. at 23. The Court in Chapman gave three examples of constitu-
tional errors that necessitate automatic reversal under the above standard:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial of assistance of counsel
at trial); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge).
10. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (denial of assistance
of counsel at a post-indictment lineup); Granger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709
(4th Cir. 1967); Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Vanater v. Boles, 377 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1967); Lollar v. United States, 376
F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (conflicting interests of counsel); United States v.
Ramseur, 378 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa.
45, 233 A.2d 552 (1967) (use at trial of evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure); People v. Coffey, 67 A.C. 145, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 457 (1967) (use of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction to im-
peach defendant's credibility); People v. Smith, 38 Ill. 2d 13, 230 N.E.2d
188 (1967) (denial of right to cross-examine).
11. See United States v. Ramseur, 378 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1967); Van-
ater v. Boles, 377 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1967).
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has held, however, that the use of an inadmissible confession at trial
requires reversal regardless of other competent evidence to uphold
the conviction. 12 The reason most often advanced for this rule is
that "once a confession is introduced, it is virtually impossible to
determine the actual weight accorded it by the jury since a con-
fession normally constitutes persuasive evidence of guilt."
'"
California has attempted to resolve these conflicting consid-
erations by holding that the introduction of a confession violative
of Escobedo or Miranda required automatic reversal while the in-
troduction of an admission so obtained can be tested by the harm-
less error standard of Chapman.14 But California has made an ex-
ception to this rule when competent confessions are available and
admitted into evidence along with the constitutionally tainted con-
fession.' 5 In such a case the court is free to apply the harmless error
rule even to confessions.' 6 Nevada also follows this exception and
applies harmless error to confessions. 1'7 A recent California case
on the subject is People v. Alesi s in which the defendant was
charged with sales of heroin and possession of marijuana. The de-
fendant was arrested and taken to the police station in a police car.
While in the vehicle and before he was warned of his constitu-
tional rights, he was asked about a certain sale of heroin. He re-
plied that he did not think he was guilty of the sale, that he
thought a girl companion had made the sale, but that he was
along at the time.'9 The defendant's statement which the appel-
late court referred to as an admission was allowed into evidence.
The lower court's ruling was held to be harmless error under
the Chapman standard since the statements admitted into evi-
dence were entirely consistent with the accused's defense at trial.20
Difficulty arises with the California confession-admission di-
chotomy chiefly in distinguishing an admission from a confession.
21
12. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
13. 65 MIcH. L. REv. 563, 566 (1967). This article presents a thorough
treatment of the pre-Chapman harmless error-automatic reversal dichot-
omy.
14. People v. Powell, 67 A.C. 25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137
(1967); In re Cline, 255 A.C.A. 135, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967).
15. See People v. Cotter, 63 Cal. 2d 386, 405 P.2d 862, 46 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1965); People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 40 Cal. Rptr. 515
(1965); People v. Patton, 255 A.C.A. 385, 62 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1967).
16. People v. Patton, 255 A.C.A. 385, 62 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1967).
17. Guyette v. Nevada, 438 P.2d 244 (Nev. 1968).
18. 67 A.C. 883, 434 P.2d 360, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967).
19. Id. at 885, 434 P.2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
20. Id.
21. In re Cline, 255 A.C.A. 135, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967) stated that:
A confession, in criminal law, is a statement by a person ac-
cused of crime to the effect that he is guilty of the crime; unless the
statement is broad enough to include every essential necessary to
make out a case against him, it is not a confession of guilt.
[Vol. 72
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Of note in this regard is the Ohio rule which apparently requires
an automatic reversal for the use of any statements violative of
Escobedo, without distinguishing between confessions and ad-
missions.22 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the California dis-
tinction between confessions and admissions is valid. The Supreme
Court held that constitutional error can be tested by a harmless
error standard before either Escobedo or Miranda were decided.
23
With a constitutional harmless error standard already available, it
would seem that the Supreme Court could have considered whether
the violations in Escobedo or Miranda were harmless error rather
than reversing automatically, but this point was never discussed.
Since both Escobedo and Miranda involved the use of inadmissible
confessions, this would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court
was of the opinion that the use of confessions violative of Esco-
bedo or Miranda necessitated automatic reversal. Considering the
number of recent state cases applying the harmless standard to
admissions, the silence of the Supreme Court may be considered
as acquiescence on this point.
In view of the foregoing, it would seem that the decision in
Padgett is sound. In Padgett, there was only a very limited use of
the defendant's statement for impeachment purposes. 24 This cer-
[citing cases]. An admission, in contrast, is but an acknowledge-
ment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient
to authorize a conviction and which only tends toward the ulti-
mate proof of guilt. [citing cases].
Id. at 140, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The court stated that while some state-
ments are easily labeled confessions or admissions, others involve diffi-
culty. Id.
22. See State v. Gresham, 10 Ohio App. 2d 199, 227 N.E.2d 248 (1967).
In discussing the effect of an Escobedo violation, the court said:
The Supreme Court of the United States has precluded the
application of the "harmless error" rule to cases wherein there is
an improper admission of inadmissable statements and has in
effect held that such improper admission constitutes prejudicial
error per se even where there exists other evidence to establish
guilt.
Id. at 209, 227 N.E.2d at 251. It is to be noted, however, that the court cited,
inter alia, for this proposition Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963),
and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). Both cases involved con-
fessions, so perhaps the court in Gresham intended to limit its automatic
reversal rule to situations involving confessions only.
23. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (use of evidence obtained
by an illegal search and seizure).
24. Padgett was a bartender and the murder occurred following a
disagreement at the bar between Padgett and the deceased, one Howard.
The use of Padgett's statement at trial was as follows:
On four occasions during Padgett's cross-examination the Com-
monwealth quoted from Padgett's statement; two can be classified
as involving contradictions, one as an omission and one as consist-
ent. The two contradictions comprise the following: Padgett tes-
tified at trial that Howard was standing at the bar when he ac-
cused Padgett of taking his drink while in the statement Padgett
placed Howard as seated at the bar; at trial Padgett insisted that
he was not certain as to the length of his acquaintance with
Howard (but that it was more than one year) although in his
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tainly falls short of admitting into evidence an inadmissible con-
fession. The court was satisfied that the use of Padgett's state-
ment was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" as required by
Chapman. Assuming that the jury chose to believe Padgett's state-
ment and reject his trial testimony, there was nothing in that
statement which in any way derogated from Padgett's version of
the crime.
25
The court in Padgett, however, found a basis other than the
confession-admission dichotomy to justify the application of the
Chapman harmless error rule. The court offered United States v.
Wade26 as authority that the Supreme Court would hold that an
Escobedo or Miranda violation could be harmless error. Wade,
drawing upon the premises of Escobedo and Miranda, held that a
post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution
which entitled the defendant to the assistance of counsel.2 7 The
case was remanded to the district court to determine "whether the
in-court identifications had an independent source or whether, in
any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error"
under the Chapman standard.28 Thus, the Supreme Court con-
sidered it possible that the introduction of evidence based upon a
lineup in which the defendant was deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel could be harmless error. Furthermore, Wade's
dependence upon Escobedo and Miranda indicated that the harm-
less error rule can be applied to Escobedo and Miranda violations.2 9
The Padgett court also drew a further parallel between Wade
violations and Escobedo and Miranda violations by examining the
retroactivity-prospectively of those cases. In Johnson v. New
Jersey"° it was held that neither Miranda nor Escobedo applied
statement he related that he knew Howard for about one year.
Padgett testified that he told Howard that he had not served him
a drink, but the statement, as pointed out by the prosecution,
omitted any reference to this remark. Finally, Padgett testified
that, at the instant the fatal shot was fired, Howard was "moving
in" as if he was going to strike Padgett, while in the statement,
as read to the jury, Padgett said "it was as if he was going to
leap on you."
428 Pa. at 237, 237 A.2d at 213.
25. 428 Pa. at 237, 238, 237 A.2d at 213. It is to be noted that no-
where in Padgett did the court refer to its language in the prior case of
Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967). That case in-
volved an Escobedo violation and the court stated that a defendant is de-
prived of due process "if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon
an unconstitutionally tainted admission or confession without regard for
the truth or falsity thereof, even though there is ample evidence aside from
the admission or confession to support the verdict." 426 Pa. at 195, 196, 231
A.2d at 303 (emphasis added). This was referred to by the court in Vivian
as the automatic reversal doctrine. Id. at n.2.
26. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
27. Id. at 227.
28. Id. at 242.
29. 428 Pa. at 234, 237 A.2d at 212.
30. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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retroactively. Similarly, Stovall v. Denno1 held that Wade did not
apply retroactively. Stovall said that in deciding whether or not
to make a decision retroactive, the impact that the prohibited
procedure may have upon the reliability of the fact-finding process
must be "weighed against the prior justified reliance on the old
standard and the impact of retroactivity upon the administration
of justice."3 2 It was under this same standard that Miranda and
Escobedo were held not to be retroactive.3 3  Padgett found that
Wade, Escobedo and Miranda presented similar considerations for
purposes of retroactivity.
Consequently, while the considerations in determining retro-
activity may not be identical to those involved in deciding if
rights are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error, '3 4 the primary consideration in either
determination is the impact that the right involved has upon the
reliability of the fact-finding process. 35 The court apparently con-
cluded that since the tests for retroactivity and automatic reversal
are so similar, a vote against retroactivity is a vote against auto-
matic reversal.3 6 Support for this conclusion is drawn from the
fact that Wade was held to be prospective and also did not require
automatic reversal.
37
The difficulty with Padgett's reasoning is that while the tests
for retroactivity and automatic reversal may be similar the former
must be balanced against prior reliance upon the old standard and
the impact of retroactivity on the administration of justice, while
the latter stands alone. Thus it would be possible to deny retro-
activity in a case because the impact on the administration of
justice outweighed the impact on the reliability of the fact-find-
ing process, but at the same time grant automatic reversal since
there would be nothing to balance out the impact on the reliability
of the fact-finding process.
It is submitted that these difficulties would be avoided by fol-
lowing the California rule that the introduction into evidence of a
confession violative of Escobedo or Miranda calls for automatic re-
versal, while the use of anything less than a confession can be tested
by the harmless error rule of Chapman.38 This would permit the
same result in Padgett since the defendant's confession was never
admitted into evidence. It would also recognize that once a con-
fession is admitted into evidence, it is virtually impossible for it to
31. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
32. Id. at 298.
33. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728, 729 (1966).
34. Chapman at 23.
35. 428 Pa. at 235, 237 A.2d at 212.
36. Id. at 236, 237 A.2d at 212. The Nevada Supreme Court in the case
of Guyette v. Nevada, 428 P.2d 244 (Nev. 1968), follows this reasoning.
37. 428 Pa. at 235, 237 A.2d at 212.
38. Cases cited note 14 supra.
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be harmless error,3 9 since its true impact on the jury cannot be
ascertained.
TIMOTHY McNICKLE
39. The cases cited in note 15 supra demonstrate an exception to
this rule.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-A LIMITATION ON THE
DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY OF § 402A
Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968).
A restriction on the recently developing doctrine of strict
tort liability in products liability cases was iterated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp.1 The court held
that in order to recover under the rule of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, section 402A, the plaintiff must prove that the defective
condition of the product was the sole cause of the plaintiff's inju-
ries. Thus, even though there was sufficient evidence to enable
a jury to find a defect in the product and thus invoke the rule of
strict liability, the court would not permit the plaintiff's case to go
to the jury because of the possible intervening negligence of a
third party.
The injury to the plaintiff, a service station operator, occurred
when a new tire exploded while he was attempting to "reseat" the
tire on the wheel. The tire had been purchased and mounted by
the retailer who in turn had purchased it from Gulf Tire & Supply
Company, the distributor of the manufacturer, B. F. Goodrich
Company. The following day the purchaser of the tire was in-
formed that his wheel was "wobbling." He took his car to Forry to
have the wheel checked. An inspection of the wheel disclosed
that the inner side of the tire appeared to be "unseated" at one
point. To remedy this Forry removed the wheel, placed it on a
tire mounting machine, deflated then partially inflated the tire,
removed the tire-wheel assembly and placed it on the floor. While
inflating the tire again, the tire exploded severely injuring Forry.
Forry sued the retail seller, the distributor and the manufac-
turer and alleged that all three defendants were jointly and sever-
ally liable on theories of negligence and strict liability.2 Upon com-
pletion of plaintiff's case as to liability the trial court granted a
compulsory nonsuit and on appeal the supreme court affirmed by
an equally divided court.
In Pennsylvania the injured consumer has three theories of
liability which he can assert as bases for the manufacturer's lia-
bility: (1) breach of warranty through an action of assumpsit,
(2) negligence through an action of trespass, and (3) strict lia-
bility through an action of trespass. Breach of warranty was not
1. 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968).
2. While the complaint contained language of negligence, it would
also have sufficed to state a cause of action for strict liability. Webb v.
Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d 853, 854-55 (1966); see 3 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 46.02[2] (1965); Emroch, Pleading and
Proof in a Strict Products Liability Case, 1966 INS. L.J. 581, 586.
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available to Forry because of his lack of privity with the defend-
ants,2 therefore he relied on negligence and strict liability.
The doctrine of strict tort liability of a supplier of a defective
product for physical harm to a user or consumer has recently
been incorporated into Pennsylvania law by the adoption of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4 Section 402A
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
The comments to 402A indicate that it applies to tires5 and that it
requires no privity of contract for the imposition of liability,6 so
that all three defendants in Forry would be considered "sellers"
within the meaning of that section.
7
The rule of strict liability requires that plaintiff prove that
the product was in a defective condition when it left the hands
of the seller.8 However, the limitation imposed by the supreme
court in Forry-that is, the defect be the sole cause of the accident
-is not borne out by a reading of 402A and the comments thereto.
Nor do other portions of the Restatement support this ruling.
The Restatement rules concerning causation in negligence cases
indicate that the conduct of any one tortfeasor need not be the
sole cause of the accident in order to render him liable.
9
3. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 406 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Loch v. Confair, 361
Pa. 183, 63 A.2d 24 (1949); Marcus v. Spada Bros. Auto Service, 41 Pa. D.
& C.2d 794 (C.P. Phila. 1967); cf. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272,
199 A.2d 463 (1964).
4. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). See 71 DICK. L.
REV. 129 (1966).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment d (1965).
6. Id. Comment 1.
7. Id. Comment f; Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 343-44, 237
A.2d 593, 599 (1968). For this reason the court's discussion and adoption
of § 400, providing for the vicarious liability of one who puts out as his
own a chattel manufactured by another, was unnecessary in this case.
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
9. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 430, Comment d (1965).
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If the manufacturer negligently constructs a defective tire and
his distributor's vendee negligently mounts the tire, both should
be liable to the injured person. 10 It appears that this has been the
law of Pennsylvania. In Loch v. Confair" the plaintiff was in-
jured when she picked up a bottle of ginger ale in a grocery store
and the bottle exploded. The court stated: "[I]f the occurrence of
the accident was due to negligence on the part of either of the
defendants [grocer or bottler], plaintiffs should be entitled to re-
dress."'12 The rule should be the same in a strict liability case, so
that the intervening negligence of a third person will not relieve
the maker of a defective product of his strict tort liability. 3
In Lewis v. United States Rubber Co.,14 the plaintiff was in-
jured when a tire, which he was mounting on a wheel, exploded in
his face. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict
for the plaintiff based on the manufacturer's negligence. The cause
of the explosion was found to be a defective bead assembly, the
same defect present in the Forry case. The court in Forry stated:
[0] n the record before us, there is evidence from which the
jury could have found the existence of a defect in the tire
... it could reasonably be inferred that this defect in the
tire existed when it left the hands of Goodrich [the manu-
facturer] .1
In Lewis the jury was permitted to infer negligence by circumstan-
tial evidence-the defective bead assembly, proper mounting pro-
cedure and explosion. It is submitted that whether the theory of
recovery be negligence as in Lewis or strict liability as in Forry,
the possible intervening negligence of a third person which con-
tributed to the accident should not bar the plaintiff's recovery.' 6
The decision in Forry appears to rest on the fact that the
plaintiff failed to show negligence by the person who mounted the
tire. Thus, his case fell because it was based on showing that the
accident occurred as a result of the defective condition of the
tire and negligence in the mounting of the tire. The problem with
10. 1 L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2 § 11.04[4] (1964); see,
e.g., Post v. Manitowoc Engineering Corp., 88 N.J. Super. 199, 211 A.2d
386 (1965).
11. 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
12. Id. at 217, 93 A.2d at 453; cf. Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265,
271, 273, 205 A.2d 873, 877-78 (1965) (not a products liability case).
13. There is very little authority on this precise question but an indi-
cation of things to come may be Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) where the manufacturer of an
automobile was held strictly liable for a defect in the automobile despite
the fact that the defect may have been caused by something that the au-
thorized dealer did or failed to do.
14. 414 Pa. 626, 202 A.2d 20 (1964).
15. 428 Pa. at 343, 237 A.2d at 598. See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 2 § 11.01[4] (1964).
16. See Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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such a result, as pointed out in the dissent.17 is that Forry also
alleged that each defendant was solely liable to him for his in-
dividual acts.18 Therefore plaintiff's showing of the defect in the
tire and the explosion should have been enough under the ra-
tionale of the Lewis case to get plaintiff's case against the manu-
facturer to the jury on an inference of negligence.19 Certainly the
court's subsequent adoption of strict liability in tort should not
deprive Forry of the benefit of the Lewis decision.
2 0
If the plaintiff proves that a defect existed in the product and
that it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, he has
sustained the burden of establishing causation in fact.2 1 This is
especially true where, as in Forry, the circumstantial evidence is
such as to justify an inference that the harm was caused by a
defect in the product.
WILLIAM T. DYER
17. 428 Pa. at 348-49, 237 A.2d at 601.
18. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit the plaintiff to
state his claim in the alternative. PA. R. Civ. P. 1020 (c).
Alternative pleading has become, since the adoption of the Rules, a
common method of overment. It may be used to join two or more
defendants when it is not clear which defendant was responsible
for the loss or to join two or more theories of action when it is not
certain which theory is applicable to the facts.
Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 348, 237 A.2d 593, 601 (1968) (dis-
senting opinion), quoting 1 GOODRICH-AMRAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA
PRACTICE § 1020(c)-1, at 144 (1957).
19. Lewis v. United States Rubber Co., 414 Pa. 626, 630, 202 A.2d 20,
22-23 (1964).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment a (1965)
provides in part: "The rule stated here is not exclusive, and does not
preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence of the
seller, where such negligence can be proved."
21. Emroch, supra note 2 at 591.
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INFANTS-STATE MUST PROVE DEFENDANT TO BE A
DELINQUENT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT-
PROOF BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
INSUFFICIENT
In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968).
Karen Mitchell, eleven years old, had been missing for approxi-
mately four hours. She had been playing with Robert F. Urbasek,
the eleven year old defendant. Karen's mother asked Robert of her
whereabouts and received unsatisfactory answers. Mrs. Mitchell
then was permitted by the defendant and his sister to look in the
Urbasek garage where Karen's body was found, stabbed seven
times. The cause of death was knife stabs in the lungs and liver
and defendant Urbasek was indicted for murdering her. The state's
petition charged the defendant with violation of a state law which,
if proved, was grounds for declaring the defendant a juvenile de-
linquent. The hearing judge found by a preponderance of the
evidence that a state law had been violated and that Urbasek was
a delinquent and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. On appeal
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that a finding of de-
linquency in a minor for an act which would be criminal in an
adult must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not
merely by a preponderance of the evidence.
At common law there was no difference in the treatment ac-
corded juveniles and adults who committed the same crimes and
consequently the procedural rules for each were alike.' In the
nineteenth century, however, courts and legislatures initiated
changes by which juveniles were to be separated from adult of-
fenders in all matters.2 The "involved" juvenile was not sent to
prison where he would meet adult criminals and be exposed to
prison vices; rather, he was sent to a reformatory with children of
his own age where the state, under the parens patriae theory,
would take the place of his parents and rear him to be an admirable
product of society and the juvenile court system.
4
The minor was not to be considered a criminal although he
1. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 387 (1961); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAiv. L. REV. 104 (1909).
2. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
3. "Involved" is the term used by most juvenile courts in lieu of
"guilty."
4. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Urbasek,
38 Ill. 535, 232 N.W.2d 716 (1968); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAuv. L.
REV. 104 (1909); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MNN. L.
REv. 547 (1957).
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committed an offense which would be criminal for an adult.5 The
reason for the difference was "[t]o get away from the notion that
the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to save it from the
brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take it
in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to
protect it from the stigma . . ." The juvenile court judge would
only be the first in the line of substitute parents which the minor
would meet before he is released from the reformatory. "Seated
at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put
his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge,
while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in
the effectiveness of his work. '7 This is the ideal.
The paternal treatment of the minor after he is "convicted",
however, is really only anti-climatic of the juvenile court system's
removal of the minor from the adult criminal world. More im-
portantly, his special status precludes him from the procedural
safeguards afforded adults during the trial stage. In most juvenile
courts hearsay is admissible," and a transcript is not required be-
cause the proceedings are to be kept from the public.9 There is
no provision for bail, 1 no notice to parents and, until recently, no
privilege against self-incrimination and no right to counsel."' All
this, and more, is lost because the juvenile is not to be treated as
a criminal. Another result is that, in most jurisdictions the juve-
nile hearing does not conform to the rules of a criminal proceed-
ing; 12 the rules of a civil trial prevail. But even these rules have
been eroded by the parens patriae theory when, for example,
fundamental rights such as the right to cross-examine are taken
from the minor.
5. See, e.g., Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAuv. L. REV. 104 (1909);
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957).
6. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 109 (1909).
7. Id. at 120.
8. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
9. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 180, 407 P.2d 760 (1965),
rev'd, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
10. See, e.g., In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952);
State v. Fullmer, 76 Ohio App. 335, 62 N.E.2d 268 (1945); Antieau, Consti-
tutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 180, 407 P.2d 760 (1965),
rev'd, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
12. See, e.g., Love v. State, 36 Ala. App. 693, 63 So. 2d 285 (1956);
Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P.2d 298 (1956); Ex parte King,
141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919); Ex parte Leach, 99 Cal. App. 645, 279
P. 157 (1929); Marlow v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137
(1911); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); Robison v.
Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908); In re Poulin,
100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957); Ex parte Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A.
716 (1920); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); Malone v.
State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E 473 (1936); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213




Many courts and writers are dissatisfied with the juvenile
court theory and its consequences. 13 Two recent Supreme Court
cases rectified some of the parens patriae theory's faults and
raised grave doubt as to the system's effectiveness. Kent v. United
States,14 confined to the District of Columbia, held that when the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court is waived to permit trial in a
criminal court, the minor must be given a hearing on the waiver,
his counsel must be given access to the youth's records and the
judge must give his reasons for allowing the waiver. In Applica-
tion of Gault15 the court went further and held that a minor
has the right to be given notice of the charges against him, the right
to counsel, the right to confront his accusers, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the right to cross-examination.
Many saw the Gault case as the beginning of the end of the
juvenile court system. This forewarning not only emerges from
the language of the opinion but lies in its essence. The expecta-
tion of the end of the system has not, however, materialized. One
manner by which the "old" system is retained in many states is
their adherence to the "proof by a preponderance of the evidence"
test.
Although the standards set forth in Gault purported to be com-
prehensive, they left unanswered the important question of the
quantum of proof needed to adjudge a minor delinquent-the
criminal trial rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the civil
trial rule of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 16 The gap
between the two is wide, and is one of the primary differences
between civil and criminal trials. Because the juvenile hearing
was considered to be essentially a civil trial, the rule that devel-
oped in most states was that a minor may be found "involved" by
a preponderance of the evidence. 17 Thus, the minor may be com-
13. See the dissenting opinion in In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 559, 109 A.2d
523 (1954); see also Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960);
Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387
(1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547
(1957); Note, Due Process in Juvenile Courts, 2 CATHOLIC U.L.R. 90 (1952);
Note, Rights of Juveniles to Constitutional Guarantees in Delinquency Pro-
ceedings, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 968 (1927).
14. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. A third test, clear and convincing proof, is similar to the civil test
of preponderance of the evidence and therefore is not dealt with here. For
a discussion of this test see, Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 180, 407 P.2d 760
(1965), rev'd, Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala.
1957); In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966); In re
Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. App. 1964); Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398,
118 So. 184 (1928); In re Barkus, 95 N.W.2d 674, 168 Neb. 257 (1959); In re
Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Smith, 21 App. Div.
2d 737, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1964); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E.
353 (1932); In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Osborne v. State, 343 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); In re Bradley, 167
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mitted to a reformatory on the same evidence on which an adult
would be acquitted. The minor, furthermore, could be committed
for a longer period of time than if an adult had been convicted.'8
Our courts have thereby subjected the minor to greater restraints
than an adult while denying him the same safeguards.
The spirit of Gault is clearly antithetical to this standard.
Nevertheless, some courts still adhere to the preponderance of the
evidence test, justifying their action on the ground that the juve-
nile proceeding is essentially civil.19 They reason that Gault did
not change this status. In re Urbasek adopted a contrary view.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that Gault implied that the
applicable test is proof beyond a reasonable doubt,20 thereby over-
ruling its prior cases and voiding a state statute.2' It concluded:
[T] he reasons which caused the Supreme Court to import
the constitutional requirements of an adversary criminal
trial into delinquency hearings logically require that a
finding of delinquency for misconduct, which would be
criminal if charged against an adult, is valid only when
the acts of delinquency are proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to have been committed by the juvenile charged.
•... [The Gault] opinion exhibits a spirit that transcends
the specific issues there involved, and ... in view thereof,
it would not be consonant with due process or equal protec-
tion to grant allegedly delinquent juveniles the same pro-
cedural rights that protect adults charged with crimes,
while depriving these rights of their full efficacy by allow-
ing a finding of delinquency upon a lesser standard of
proof than that required to sustain a criminal conviction.
22
The transcending spirit to which the Illinois court refers ap-
parently arises from the United States Supreme Court's analogy of
a juvenile hearing to a criminal trial and its seeming dissatisfac-
tion with the juvenile court system.
2'
P.2d 97 (Utah 1946); Berry v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 1, 245 P. 409
(1926). Contra, In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931);
People v. Anonymous, 53 Misc. 2d 690, 279 N.Y.S.2d 540 (C.C. Nassau 1967);
In re Rich, 86 N.Y.S.2d 308 (D.R.N.Y. 1949); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185
Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
18. The adult found guilty of a crime such as petit larceny or a mis-
demeanor has imposed upon him a fine or a relatively short prison term.
The juvenile, however, may be confined in a reformatory until his majority
regardless of his age at the hearing. Thus a ten year old delinquent may be
imprisoned eleven years for stealing a bag of candy. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); State v. Cagle, III S.C. 548,
96 S.E. 291 (1918).
19. In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. App. 1964); In re Urbasek, 76
Ill. App. 2d 375, 222 N.E.2d 233 (1966), rev'd, 38 Ill. 535, 232 N.E.2d 716
(1968).
20. 38 Ill. 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968).
21. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-4, 704-6 (1965).
22. In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 535, 232 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1968).
23. A federal district court has recently held that juveniles have a
Constitutional right to a jury trial. The spirit of the Gault opinion was one
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The theory of the juvenile court is to call the delinquent minor
something other than a criminal, 4 and thereby free the minor from
the social consequences that surround criminals and ex-convicts.
As Gault points out,2 5 this result has not been attained. Juvenile
delinquents are looked on by the public with the same jaundiced
eye awarded to criminals. A youth with a delinquency record is
rejected from many jobs, discriminated against by the military and,
no doubt, by educational institutions.2 16 Moreover, his confinement
is similar to that of adult criminals.27  Both are confined for long
periods of time; their companions are prisoners who have been
found guilty of crimes ranging from petit larceny to murder, and
dictatorial disciplinary measures are substituted for freedom.
Terms such as "receiving home," "industrial school," and "camp,"
are only euphuisms for prison.28 Speaking of the juvenile's need
for counsel the Gault court said: "A proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected
to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to
a felony prosecution. '29 A person accused of a felony must be
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The consequences of a
guilty verdict are serious, and apparently the Urbasek court be-
lieved that if the state may only take an adult's freedom by prov-
ing that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then the minor
who likewise can lose his freedom for a number of years, should
be proved involved by the same standard. According to Gault,
cliches and distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings are
meaningless when the results of both adjudications are the same.
3 0
There was, however, one distinction with which the Gault
decision was concerned: the lack of safeguards in a juvenile
hearing compared to a criminal trial.31 Holding that the Con-
stitution protects juveniles against self-incrimination, the Gault
court said: "It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against
self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
children. '3 2 Furthermore, since the result of a conviction for ei-
ther is basically similar, the juvenile should have the same right
as the adult criminal defendant. One of these rights, the Illinois
court now holds, is the right of the juvenile to have the state
ground for the holding. Speaking of the right to a jury trial, the court
said, "[w]e read Gault to require the availability of that right in any
federal juvenile proceeding in which a youth is faced with incarceration
for the commission of an act alleged to be violative of federal law."
Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24. See note 5 supra.
25. 387 U.S. 24-27 (1967).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Holmes,
379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
28. Id.
29. 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
30. Id. at 49, 50.
31. Id. at 28, 29.
32. Id. at 47.
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prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
3 3
It may be argued, however, that the Gault decision does not
imply that a reasonable doubt test is required in juvenile pro-
ceedings. Gault involved a lack of procedural devices which were
common to both criminal and civil trials.34 The issue simply was:
did Gault get a fair hearing? The Supreme Court found he did
not. The distinction between criminal and civil is meaningless
where the minimum requisite safeguards in either proceeding are
absent. In Gault, such safeguards were lacking and consequently
the hearing was unfair no matter what name it was given. The
Supreme Court alluded to this when in Gault it reaffirmed its opin-
ion in Kent v. United States:3 5 "We do not mean . . . to indicate
that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the require-
ments of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hear-
ing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essen-
tials of due process and fair treatment."3 8 Similarly, the Gault
court required notice which is ". . . adequate in a civil or criminal
proceeding."3 7 Therefore, it is not the name by which the pro-
ceeding is called but the lack of standards and safeguards that
is important in both juvenile and criminal cases. It would seem to
follow then, that as long as some standard is used by which the
judge may determine the juvenile's guilt, the hearing is a fair
one. That standard, though, should be an accepted one such as
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing
proof, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There is another rea-
son to believe that Gault was not concerned with the standard of
proof issue. Presumably it could have added dicta on this question.
Its failure to do so indicates that it was satisfied with the pre-
ponderance of the evidence test.
It is submitted that since the consequences of a finding of
delinquency are essentially no different than a finding of guilty in
an adult criminal case, the reasonable doubt testis the better
standard. To subject a youth to confinement for a long period of
time on a lesser quantity of proof than that used to find an adult
guilty of the same offense is discriminatory, especially by a system
which purports to hold as its paramount interest, the rehabili-
tation and the welfare of the minor. Illinois was a leader in the
juvenile court movement of the nineteenth century. By its deci-
sion in In re Urbasek, it is carrying forward the spirit of that
movement by refusing to characterize a youth as a "junior crimi-
nal" without proving him such beyond a reasonable doubt.
HENRY E. SEWrNSKY, JR.
33. In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968).
34. Id. at 17, 21.
35. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
36. Id. at 562.
37. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
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REAL ESTATE BROKER-FAILURE OF PURCHASER
TO CLOSE TITLE AS DEFEATING RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
There has been little controversy in recent years as to when a
real estate broker has earned a right to his commission. The rule
enforced by a vast majority of jurisdictions is:
Where a real-estate broker procures a customer who
is accepted by the principal, and a valid, binding, or en-
forcible contract is drawn between them, the commission
for finding the customer is earned, even though the cus-
tomer fails or refuses to comply with the contract.'
In Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson2 the New Jersey supreme court
broke with almost a century of precedent which sustained this
rule3 and held that the broker was not entitled to his commission
unless and until the purchaser consummated the sale by closing
title.
4
The broker in Dobbs brought an action on a general listing
brokerage contract, the conditions of which he claimed to have per-
formed. The contract provided for payment of one-third of the
broker's commission upon closing of title; the balance was due as
the vendors received payments from the purchaser under a pur-
chase-money mortgage arrangement. 5 The provisions of the bro-
1. Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 437, 443 (1960) (The annotation lists cases in
45 jurisdictions sustaining the quoted proposition); see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 445 (1958) (especially comment d).
2. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Blau v. Friedman, 26 N.J. 397, 140 A.2d 193 (1958);
Hatch v. Dayton, 130 N.J.L. 425, 33 A.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Hinds v.
Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873).
4. 50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
5. The terms of the contract were quoted in the opinion of the court:
The commission hereinafter mentioned shall be payable as fol-
lows: $5,000.00 when sellers shall have received a total of
$25,000.00 on account of the above purchase price ($10,000.00 here-
with and $15,000.00 on account of the principal sum of the above
mentioned purchase money note and mortgage); an additional
$5,000.00 when an additional $25,000.00 shall have been paid on
account of the principal sum of purchase money note and mort-
gage; and the remaining $5,000.00 when an additional $25,000.00
shall have been paid on account of the principal sum of said pur-
chase money note and mortgage. The entire commission of
$15,000.00 shall become immediately due and payable upon any
RECENT CASES
kerage contract were contained in the contract of sale between
vendors and purchaser, a contract which the parties entered into
despite the previous breach of an oral contract of sale by the pur-
chaser. At the date set for closing title, the purchaser was unable
to perform and the vendors granted an extension. Subsequently
the vendors sought specific performance and a date was set by the
court for closing title. The purchaser appeared at the appointed
time claiming he was unsuccessful in obtaining financial backing,
and the vendors released him from his obligation. 6
The Dobbs court did not limit its opinion to holding that the
particular broker before them was not entitled to a commission.
Rather, it set forth a new rule making closing of title a condition
precedent to a broker's right to commissions. This condition prece-
dent was implied in law.
Prior to Dobbs a New Jersey broker fulfilled his contractual
obligation when he tendered to the vendor a ready, willing and
able purchaser whom the vendor accepted by entering into a con-
tract of sale. This duty, which is recognized by a majority of
states,7 is based on the theory of unilateral contracts." The vendor,
by listing his land with the broker, makes a unilateral offer to the
broker. The terms of the offer are that should the broker produce
a purchaser who will buy on vendor's terms the vendor will pay
the broker a commission.9 Entry into a contract of sale signifies
acceptance by the vendor of the purchaser 0 and evidences the
vendor's satisfaction with the broker's performance."
The obligation of the vendor to pay the broker under the
majority rule is subject to a number of exceptions. It has been
sale or assignment by sellers of said purchase money note and
mortgage.
And the Seller hereby agrees to pay to Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc.
a commission of Six (6) % on the purchase price aforesaid, said
commission to be paid in consideration of services rendered in
consummating this sale; said commission to become due and pay-
able as above mentioned.
50 N.J. at 538-39, 236 A.2d at 848.
6. For discussion of whether release by a vendor of a defaulting
purchaser from his obligations under a contract of sale makes the vendor
liable to the broker for commissions, see Note, Special Conditions in Real
Estate Brokerage Contracts, 32 COL. L. REV. 1194 (1932); 31 COL. L. REV. 701
(1931); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 437, 459-61 (1960).
7. See note 1 supra.
8. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 50 (1963).
9. Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873).
10. Even an oral contract of sale has been deemed sufficient accept-
ance to require a vendor to pay a brokerage commission. Mercner v. Fay,
71 N.J. Super. 519, 177 A.2d 481 (1962).
11. See Brewer v. Williams, 147 Colo. 146, 362 P.2d 1033 (1961); Ache-
son v. Smith's, Inc., 110 Fla. 240, 148 So. 576 (1933); Bloomberg v. Greylock
Broadcasting Co., 342 Mass. 542, 174 N.E.2d 438 (1961); Brindley v. Brook,
10 N.J. Misc. 612, 160 A. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Colvin v. Post Mortgage &
Land Co., 255 N.Y. 510, 122 N.E.2d 454 (1919).
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held that the broker's tendering of a purchaser is an implied rep-
resentation that the purchaser is ready, willing and able to buy.
12
If the purchaser subsequently fails to perform, and if the vendor
relied on the broker's judgment as to whether the purchaser was
ready, willing and able, then there may be no obligation to pay the
broker's commission. 13 Closely allied to this implied representa-
tion theory is the bad faith exception. Where the broker has
breached his fiduciary relation to the vendor and has concealed
facts or made false representations which induced the sale, then
the vendor has no duty to pay the commission. 14 The broker, who
in theory is the agent of the vendor, has the same responsibility to
his principal as any other agent. Breach of this responsibility
gives the principal the power to terminate the agent's rights under
the agency agreement.
1 5
A third exception is the failure of the purchaser to close title
due to financial inability. Courts recognizing this exception hold
that, even though the vendor has accepted the purchaser by en-
tering into a contract of sale, the broker is not entitled to a com-
mission if the purchaser is financially unable to perform."0 Finally,
it has been held that where payments are conditioned on receipt of
the purchase price or any part thereof and the purchaser defaults
before payment, the broker is not entitled to a commission. 7
The Dobbs court could have retained the majority rule by us-
ing one of the exceptions, or a combination of them, to preclude
the broker's right to commission. It chose, however, to adopt "a
new and more realistic approach to the problem""' based on "the
fundamental intendment of the parties, owner and broker, i.e.,
that the owner will sell and the buyer will pay, and the broker
will thus earn his commission out of the proceeds."'19 To imple-
ment this new approach the court conditioned the broker's right to
commission not only on producing a ready, willing, and able buyer
whom the purchaser accepts, but also on closing of title.
12. Butler v. Baker, 17 R.I. 582, 23 A. 1019 (1892).
13. Id.; accord, Valois v. Pelletier, 84 R.I. 176, 122 A.2d 148 (1956).
14. See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (1958); Carter v. Owens, 58 Fla.
204, 50 So. 641 (1909); Hare v. Bauer, 223 Minn. 285, 26 N.W.2d 359 (1947);
R. A. Poff & Co. v. Ottoway, 191 Va. 779, 62 S.E.2d 865 (1951).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AcENCY §§ 407, 409, 469 (1958).
16. Moore v. Burke, 45 A.2d 285 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1946); see
24 TEMP. L.Q. 357 (1951); 74 A.L.R.2d 437, 454-59 (1960) (discussion of
cases which both allow and deny recovery by the broker).
17. Sweet v. H.R. Howenstein Co., 73 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Cham-
bers v. Armour, 76 Fla. 577, 83 So. 721 (1919); Amies v. Wesnofske, 255
N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 436 (1931); Matuszewski v. Grisius, 118 Pa. Super. 196,
180 A. 130 (1935); see also Taylor Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. Greene, 274
Ala. 694, 151 So. 2d 397 (1963).
18. 50 N.J. 528, 547, 236 A.2d 843, 852 (1967).
19. 50 N.J. at 552, 236 A.2d at 855; see Dennis Reed, Ltd. v. Goody,
[1950] 2 K.B. 277, 284-85, 1 All E.R. 919, 923 (1950) quoted in Dobbs, 50
N.J. at 549-50, 236 A.2d at 853-54.
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The Dobbs rule is subject to some justifiable criticism. 0 Both
the broker and the vendor have practically the same opportunity
to investigate the financial ability and the willingness of the pur-
chaser to complete the transaction by closing title. The vendor
could investigate the purchaser before entering the contract of
sale, and presumably would have no more knowledge of the pur-
chaser than has the broker. Furthermore, when the vendor does
enter a contract of sale he gains an enforceable right against the
purchaser to have the contract specifically performed.21 If the ven-
dor correctly assesses the intentions of the purchaser prior to ac-
cepting him by entering into a contract of sale, then acquiring a
right to specific performance of the contract is equivalent to com-
pleting the transaction.
The strengths of the Dobbs rule, however, would seem to over-
shadow its criticism. As noted by the court, it gives effect to the
intention of the vendor in placing his property on the market.
He is interested in transferring title to the property, not merely
obtaining a contract right enforceable through litigation. Closing
of title, on the other hand, will in most cases result in complete pay-
ment of the purchase price to the vendor, thus guaranteeing satis-
faction to both vendor and broker.
The force of this policy is limited because the Dobbs rule will
not entirely resolve the problem of brokers' commissions. In
some instances, as in Dobbs, part of the commission is payable on
closing of title with the balance due as the vendors are paid in-
stallments on a purchase-money mortgage. If the purchaser closes
title and subsequently defaults, the question arises as to whether
the commission will still be due. The New Jersey court, if it
were to apply the Dobbs rule strictly, would have to hold the
vendor obligated to pay the commission. If, however, the court
looks to the reason it gave for the rule-"that the owner will sell
and the buyer will pay, and the broker will thus earn his commis-
sion out of the proceeds" 22-then it will undoubtedly find that
the vendor is liable to the broker for no more of the commission
than has already been paid.2  Otherwise, the broker might not
earn his commission out of the proceeds. As previously indicated,
this result has been reached in jurisdictions which follow the ma-
jority rule.2 4 If the purchase-money mortgage situation is recog-
nized as an exception to the Dobbs rule, then the policy advanced
by the court in adopting the rule is not crippled.
20. See A Survey of the Law of Real Estate Brokerage Contracts in
New England, 36 BOSTON U.L. REV. 285, 294-98 (1956); 114 U. PA. L. REV.
380 (1966); 24 TEMP. L.Q. 357 (1951).
21. See, e.g., Dillinger v. Ogden, 244 Pa. 20, 90 A. 446 (1914).
22. 50 N.J. at 552, 236 A.2d at 855.
23. Another less desirable alternative would be to require the broker
to return to the vendor the commission already received.
24. Taylor Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. Greene, 274 Ala. 694, 151 So. 2d
397 (1963); Chambers v. Armour, 78 Fla. 577, 83 So. 721 (1919); but see
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A second justification for the new rule is that nonperformance
is a business risk to be borne by the broker,25 just as advertising
the property and showing it to potential purchasers are expenses
which the broker "risks." The expense of this risk is minimal in
terms of cash outlay by the broker, particularly when balanced
against his potential gain. The vendor, moreover, contemplated a
gain for both parties when he offered the contract to the broker.
It does not seem equitable that the broker should gain from a
business transaction which does not produce the desired result and
that the vendor should pay for that gain.
Finally, adoption of the Dobbs rule would have the effect of
virtually eliminating bad faith brokers. If the broker suspected
that the prospective purchaser might have reservations about en-
tering a contract of sale, or might not be financially able to per-
form, he would not be anxious to rush a contract of sale. Such a
contract would take the land off the market and preclude him from
finding a purchaser who would be more likely to complete the
transaction.
While the specific holding in Dobbs is limited to brokerage
contracts which provide for scheduled payment of the broker's
commission out of purchase money received, the supreme court an-
nounced that it would apply the rule to all brokerage contracts.2 6
Indeed, it alerted real estate brokers that this rule would be ap-
plied despite contrary provisions in the brokerage contract. To
justify its prospective restriction on the freedom to contract, the
court relied upon previously developed policy which required it to
void grossly unfair contractual obligations if it finds unequal bar-
gaining power between contracting parties:
Courts and legislatures have grown increasingly sensi-
tive to imposition, conscious or otherwise, on members of
the public by persons with whom they deal, who through
experience, specialization, licensure, economic strength or
position, or membership in associations created for their
mutual benefit and education, have acquired such exper-
tise or monopolistic or practical control in the business
transaction involved as to give them an undue advantage.
2 T
That such undue advantage accrued to real estate brokers was not
evidenced solely by their experience, specialization, licensure, and
McGehee Lumber Co. v. Tomlinson, 66 Fla. 536, 63 So. 919 (1913) (Seller
who voluntarily waited to receive his commission from purchase price was
allowed to repudiate this agreement and to immediately recover the full
commission).
25. 50 N.J. at 548, 236 A.2d at 853.
26. "The basic law governing the owner-broker relationship is de-
clared to be that absent default by the owner, the contract of sale must
be performed by the buyer before liability for commission is imposed
on the owner." 50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
27. 50 N.J. at 553, 236 A.2d at 856.
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membership in mutual benefit associations, but also by standardized
contracts imposing on the vendor liability to pay the broker's com-
mission upon the signing of the contract of sale.
The question arises as to whether such criteria are an ade-
quate basis for restricting the freedom of parties to contracts, and
whether their application in the Dobbs setting is justified. Ex-
perience, licensure, specialization, and membership in mutual bene-
fit organizations characterize not only real estate brokers, but also
such professions as law, medicine, accounting, and insurance. In-
deed, such criteria would seem to characterize many occupations
in today's society. Reliance on them as giving rise to undue bar-
gaining strength of such magnitude as to justify restricting the
freedom to contract is therefore surprising.
The court also placed great emphasis on standardized broker-
age contracts which contained provisions imposing on the vendor
liability to pay brokerage commissions immediately upon entering a
contract of sale.28 Such emphasis hardly seems justified since
those provisions merely incorporate the widely accepted common
law. It is submitted, therefore, that the criteria used by the court
are inadequate to justify a finding of unconscionability in real
estate brokerage contracts.
Furthermore, on the facts of Dobbs, a finding of unconscion-
ability would clearly be unwarranted. The vendors' lawyers had
themselves prepared the contract of sale which the vendors signed.
29
They had ample opportunity to protect their clients' interests. It
was their failure, not coercion by the broker, which caused the
vendors' loss. Nor does the Uniform Commercial Code section
providing for judicial avoidance of unconscionable contract pro-
visions,3 0 cited by the court, support its reasoning. The relevant
section of the Code enacted by the New Jersey legislature, applies
only to the sale of goods.8 ' Service contracts are not included
within its ambit.
It is suggested, therefore, that while the Dobbs rule is desir-
able, it should not, as a matter of law, limit freedom to contract
in a real estate brokerage situation. A real estate broker should
earn his commission only upon producing a purchaser who com-
28. Examples of such standardized contracts are contained in the
court's opinion, 50 N.J. at 555, 236 A.2d at 857.
29. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 6. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. John-
son, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
30. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of an unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2-302(1) (1962).
31. "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article [from which
the quotation in footnote 30, supra, is taken] applies to transactions in
goods." N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2-102 (1962).
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pletes the sale by closing title. The parties to the contract
should be free, in the absence of a greater showing of uncon-
scionability than that made in Dobbs, to limit the application of
this rule by special agreement between themselves.
DEAN A. WEIDNER
